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1. Introduction
There is now convincing evidence that stock prices display 
short-term momentum over periods of six months to a year and 
longer-term mean reversion (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Chopra 
et al., 1992; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). There is also evidence of 
economically significant price reversals over short time horizons 
of a week to a month (Jegadeesh, 1990; Lehmann, 1990; Jegadeesh 
and Titman, 1995; Gutierrez and Kelley, 2008).1 This evidence pro-
vides support for trading rules designed to detect persistent trends 
in asset prices. Research has shown that such rules have predic-
tive power in equity markets (Brock et al., 1992) and in foreign ex-
change markets (Dooley and Schafer, 1983; Sweeney, 1986; Levich 
and Thomas, 1993; Neely et al., 1997; Dueker and Neely, 2007).
The use of technical signals based on price patterns has re-
ceived less academic attention, despite the fact that these sig-
nals are widely used by practitioners (Taylor and Allen, 1992; 
Lui and Mole, 1998; Cheung and Chinn, 2001). At present, we 
lack theoretical models that can explain the presence of pattern-
based trading rules, though several empirical studies suggest 
that such rules may be profitable. Chang and Osler (1999) ex-
amine the profitability of using the “head-and-shoulders” pat-
tern in the foreign exchange market to predict changes of trend, 
and find evidence of excess returns for some currencies but not 
others. Lo et al. (2000) develop a pattern detection algorithm 
based on kernel regression. They apply this methodology to 
identify a variety of technical price patterns including “head-
and-shoulders” in the US stock market over the period 1962–
1996. They find statistical evidence that there is potentially use-
ful information contained in most of the patterns they consider. 
Savin et al. (2007) show that a modified version of the algo-
rithm of Lo et al. applied to the “head-and-shoulders” pattern 
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Abstract
While many technical trading rules are based upon patterns in asset prices, we lack convincing explanations of how and why 
these patterns arise, and why trading rules based on technical analysis are profitable. This paper provides a model that ex-
plains the success of certain trading rules that are based on patterns in past prices. We point to the importance of confirma-
tion bias, which has been shown to play a key role in other types of decision making. Traders who acquire information and 
trade on the basis of that information tend to bias their interpretation of subsequent information in the direction of their orig-
inal view. This produces autocorrelations and patterns of price movement that can predict future prices, such as the “head-
and-shoulders” and “double-top” patterns. The model also predicts that sequential price jumps for a particular stock will be 
positively autocorrelated. We test this prediction and find that jumps exhibit statistically and economically significant posi-
tive autocorrelations.
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1  Conrad et al. (1991) demonstrate that bid-ask bounce explains some of this return reversal. (Cooper, 1999) and (Subrahmanyam, 2005) find that 
microstructure issues cannot fully explain the documented return reversal. 
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has substantial predictive power for US stock returns over peri-
ods of one to three months.2
The objective of this paper is to present a theoretical model that 
provides an explanation for the observed autocorrelation patterns 
in asset returns and for the documented success of both trend-fol-
lowing and pattern-based technical trading rules. We do this by in-
troducing a single cognitive bias into the model, that of confir-
mation bias. The bias is a phenomenon that has been extensively 
documented in experimental studies. It refers to the search for, or 
the interpretation of evidence in ways that favor existing beliefs 
or expectations. It has been described as “perhaps the best known 
and most widely accepted notion of inferential error to come out 
of the literature on human reasoning” (Evans, 1989, p. 41 quoted 
in Nickerson, 1998).
In our model, information arrival is modeled with signals of 
various magnitudes, arriving at differing frequencies. Large, in-
frequently observed signals are interpreted rationally by inves-
tors. However, investors’ interpretation of less informative signals 
(which arrive more frequently) is biased by the recently observed 
large signals. The model generates price patterns, most notably 
the “head-and-shoulders” pattern, that have the predictive power 
for future stock returns claimed by technical analysts. The model 
thus provides a theoretical foundation for several price patterns 
commonly used by technical analysts. The model also produces 
the well-documented pattern of price momentum which can be 
exploited by trend-following technical rules such as those based 
on the comparison of short- and long-run moving averages.
In addition, our model makes several predictions. First, re-
turn autocorrelations are negative over very short horizons, pos-
itive over intermediate horizons, and become negative again over 
long horizons. This feature of the model conforms to the empiri-
cal properties of US equity prices described above. To our knowl-
edge, our model is the first to simultaneously capture all three of 
these patterns in return autocorrelations, and provides a simple 
alternative to the microstructure-based explanation for negative 
short-horizon autocorrelations. Our model also produces a sharp 
prediction that the time-series of jumps in the price series should 
be positively autocorrelated. So far as we know, this is a new and 
untested empirical prediction.
We provide empirical evidence that confirms the prediction of 
our model that sequential price jumps in equity prices are posi-
tively autocorrelated. Specifically, we utilize the statistical bi-
power variation estimation technique to identify all statistically 
significant jumps in the daily price series of the individual com-
ponent stocks of the S&P 100 Index over the sample period 1999–
2005. We find that sequential price jumps exhibit statistically and 
economically significant positive autocorrelations, and that these 
autocorrelations decay at a rate that is also consistent with the 
model.
Our model presents an alternative momentum explanation to 
the gradual information diffusion hypothesis of Hong and Stein 
(1999). In their model, newswatchers trade on fundamental infor-
mation while momentum traders make trades based on past price 
movements. Fundamental information diffuses gradually across 
the newswatchers and this causes prices to underreact and display 
positive autocorrelation. The autocorrelation provides incentives 
for momentum traders whose simple trading strategies based on 
past prices eventually drive prices above fundamental value, lead-
ing to negative autocorrelations over longer horizons. The agents 
in their model are boundedly rational in that their decisions do 
not make use of all relevant information. Our approach is closer 
in spirit to that of Daniel et al. (1998) in that we assume that deci-
sions are affected by a psychological bias. Our model setup is dif-
ferent and begins with the arrival of a large piece of information 
that is immediately and rationally impounded into prices. This 
news biases investors’ interpretation of later information, and so 
in a sense is ‘diffusive’ in that it continues to affect future price 
changes. Like Hong and Stein (1999) our model predicts that cer-
tain trading strategies based on past prices can be profitable. Two 
notable differences are that our model predicts negative autocor-
relation in the very short-run, and also explains why certain tech-
nical price patterns forecast future returns.
Our model and empirical tests also complement the recent em-
pirical work of Gutierrez and Kelley (2008). They document neg-
ative weekly autocorrelations immediately after extreme infor-
mation events, but find that momentum profits emerge several 
weeks after an extreme return and persist over the remainder of 
the year. Moreover, this momentum easily offsets the brief and 
initial return reversal. Our model produces predictions consistent 
with this finding. They also find that markets react similarly to ex-
plicit (public) and implicit (private) news, and note that many be-
havioral models require investors to react differently to different 
types of news. In contrast, our model makes no distinction be-
tween public and private news.
Zhu and Zhou (in press) offer a rather different perspective on 
the advantages of using technical analysis. They find that when 
there is uncertainty about the degree of predictability of the stock 
price, adding a technical Moving-Average (MA) component to the 
strategy that invests a fixed percentage of wealth in stocks may in-
crease investor utility. This is because optimal dynamic strategies 
depend upon investors’ prior beliefs and learning about unknown 
model-specific parameters, while MA strategies are more robust 
to model and parameter misspecification.3 While Zhu and Zhou 
focus on the effects of technical strategies on investor utility, one 
of our main objectives is to develop a model that captures the un-
derlying phenomena that give rise to specific price patterns such 
as the head-and-shoulders or double-top patterns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sections Sections 
2 and 3 present the model. Section 4 describes various trading 
rules and relates them to the model. In Section 5 we describe our 
jump-detection methodology and present empirical results. Sec-
tion 6 concludes.
2. The confirmation bias
2.1. Existing literature on the confirmation bias
As noted above, the confirmation bias refers to the search for, 
or the interpretation of evidence in ways that favor existing beliefs 
or expectations. A related phenomenon has been extensively in-
vestigated in the management literature under the heading of “es-
2 The value of using technical trading rules based upon past prices is still an open empirical question. Jegadeesh (2000), in his discussion of Lo et 
al. (2000) points out that there is no evidence of significant one-day returns after the identification of technical indicators. This finding is con-
firmed for the UK stock market in Dawson and Steeley (2003), while Marshall et al. (2006) find that candlestick trading strategies do not have 
value for Dow Jones Industrial Average Stocks. However, Savin et al. (2007) find that with longer holding periods evidence of substantial pre-
dictive power emerges. (Bessembinder and Chan, 1998) and (Allen and Karjalainen, 1999) suggest that gross profits are available from technical 
trading but are insufficient to cover transactions costs. Osler (2003) documents that order clustering of stop-loss and take-profit orders at round 
numbers provides a justification for intraday technical analysis in the currency markets. Kavajecz and Odders-White (2004) conclude that intra-
day technical analysis captures changes in the state of the limit order book and may add value by locating liquidity in the limit order book that 
allows traders to place strategic limit orders with better execution and lower transaction costs. In contrast, Marshall et al. (2008) investigate the 
profitability of over 5000 technical trading rules using intraday data on Standard and Poor’s Depository Receipts (SPDRs) and conclude that 
technical analysis is not profitable after data snooping bias is taken into account. 
3 For a similar argument, see Blanchet-Scalliet et al. (2007). 
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calation of commitment.” This research seeks to provide explana-
tions for commitment within organizations to losing courses of 
action. Theoretical explanations often focus on the theory of cogni-
tive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). It is argued that people who are 
responsible for poor decisions seek to rationalize them by biasing 
their interpretation of information relevant for assessing the out-
come of the decisions. A study of the banking industry found that 
bank executive turnover predicted both provisions for loan losses 
and the write-off of bad loans (Staw et al., 1997). The implication 
of these findings is that those individuals responsible for making 
the original loan decisions exhibited systematic bias in their inter-
pretation of information about the status of the loans.
A specific example of how confirmation bias is recognized as 
a potential source of inefficiency within the investment commu-
nity is provided by Camerer and Loewenstein (2004, p. 17). They 
report how an investment banker had described the way in which 
his firm combated the effects of traders’ “emotional attachment 
to their past trades” by periodically forcing traders to switch po-
sitions with each other. In a study looking at dissonance effects 
in the context of mutual fund investment, Goetzmann and Peles 
(1997) found that even well-informed investors had a tendency 
to favorably distort their perceptions of the past performance of 
funds that they held. This may explain the observed asymmetry 
between investment flows into winning funds and out of losing 
funds (Ippolito, 1992).
Confirmation bias has also been shown to manifest itself in 
group decision making (Schulz-Hardt et al., 2000). Using a sam-
ple of middle managers from banks and industrial companies, the 
experiment involved analysis of a case study in which a company 
has to decide whether or not to proceed with a large investment. 
Subjects were required to come to a preliminary conclusion indi-
vidually before being combined into groups. At this point they 
were given access to additional information. Groups that agreed in 
their preliminary conclusions showed a strong preference for ac-
cessing supporting rather than conflicting information. This find-
ing is of particular interest in the present context, since many port-
folio investment decisions are the outcome of group deliberations.
2.2. The basic model with a single low-frequency signal
The process by which information is revealed and incorpo-
rated into prices is constructed to capture the important features 
of a jump-diffusion process in a discrete-time framework. The 
jump-diffusion model of stock returns has a long history (Merton, 
1976) and recent work by Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004) 
indicates that jumps in equity prices contribute a significant pro-
portion of total price volatility. Research on empirical option pric-
ing has also found that introducing jump components into the un-
derlying price series alleviates some of the pricing biases found in 
standard models (Bates, 2003).
We suppose that there are low-frequency signals that are more 
informative than high-frequency signals. One can think of the 
low-frequency signals as generating the jumps in the price series, 
and the high-frequency signals as generating the diffusion. There 
are two groups of agents. One group is subject to cognitive bias, 
whereas the other is not. We assume that those subject to bias are 
risk neutral, but that those who are rational are risk averse. This is 
a simplification similar to that made by Daniel et al. (1998). It al-
lows us to concentrate exclusively on the role of biased traders in 
setting prices, since it is their expectations that determine prices. 
Thus in what follows, all expectations will be those of the group 
subject to bias. The agents are endowed with shares of a risky se-
curity and of a risk free asset. They observe a low-frequency sig-
nal (L-signal) at date 0 about the liquidation value of a security. 
At subsequent dates, a sequence of high-frequency signals (H-sig-
nals) is observed. At date T, all information about security value is 
revealed and the investors receive its liquidation value. The sup-
ply of the asset is fixed, and thus the price at any point in time 
is equal to the biased investors’ expected liquidation value, given 
the available information.
The risky security has a liquidation value VT = θ, which has a 
prior that is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ 2
θ
 
. The signal at date 0 is
L = θ + ε,                                                                         (1)
where ε ≈ N(0, σ 2ε). It is this signal that determines the beliefs that 
generate subsequent confirmation bias in the risk neutral group of 
investors. The initial price of the asset (before the L-signal is ob-
served) is determined by the prior mean of θ, which is zero. Given 
risk neutrality, the price at date 0 is given by the expectation of θ 
conditional on L,
where w0 =  σ
2
θ
 /(σ 2
θ
  + σ 2ε). The first term in the expression for P0 
drops out because we have assumed the prior mean of θ, E(θ), to 
be zero. The information associated with the L-signal is sufficiently 
informative that it produces a jump in the price at time t = 0 equal 
to J0 = w0L. The L-signal is followed by a sequence of H-signals
Ht = θ + δt ,         t = 1, …, T                                           (2)
where δt  ≈  N(0, σ
2
δ). We introduce cognitive bias into the model by 
making a distinction between objective and perceived signals. While 
the investor’s interpretation of the L-signal is always unbiased, the 
L-signal determines a set of beliefs which influences the percep-
tion of the subsequent H-signals.
We assume that the perceived signal Hˆt takes the form
Hˆt = θ + d(w0L, t) + δt ,   t = 1, …, T.                            (3)
The value of the perceived H-signal is shifted by the value of the 
function d(w0L, t), which we call the confirmation bias function. This 
function is assumed to depend on: (a) the weighted L-signal, w0L 
and (b) the time elapsed since the L-signal is observed. We assume 
that this function takes the multiplicatively separable form
d(w0L,t) ≡ f (w0L)m(t)                                                    (4)
The properties of f (w0L) are:
P1.    f (0) = 0,
P2.    f ′(w0L) > 0,
P3.    f (–w0L) = – f (w0L)
P1 states that when the L-signal is neither favorable nor unfavor-
able (L = 0) there is no subsequent bias in the perception of the 
H-signals. P2 states that when the L-signal is favorable (unfavor-
able), there is a positive (negative) bias in the perception of the 
H-signals, and that this bias increases with the (absolute) value 
of the L-signal. P3 imposes the requirement that the bias be sym-
metric for favorable and unfavorable signals. The properties of 
m(t) are
P4.    m(t) = 1,  t = 1 ; m(t) > 0 for all t
P5.    ∂m/∂t < 0, t > 1,
P6.    lim m(t) = 0.
             
t → ∞
The property P4 of the function m(t) is a straightforward normal-
ization. P5 and P6 are intended to capture the fact that confirma-
tion bias does not persist indefinitely, but diminishes over time, 
and eventually disappears. A sufficient statistic for a given se-
quence of objective H-signals is given by the average
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(5)
A sufficient statistic for a given sequence of perceived H-signals is 
given by the average
(6)
Since the bias in the perception of the public signals amounts to an 
additive shift in the mean, the perceived variances are not affected 
and are equal to the true values. From now on it is more conve-
nient to work with precisions rather than variances, and we intro-
duce the following notation:
[equation]
The precision of  HˆAt  is tπδ. The equilibrium security price is given 
by the expectation of its liquidation value conditional on L- and 
H-signals,
(7)
where
(8)
(9)
Note that the weights here are the rational Bayesian weights. Bias 
arises only because HˆAt  ≠ H
A
t . This contrasts with the approach 
taken in behavioral models based on overconfidence, where signal 
precision is incorrectly perceived. The rational price is given by
(10)
and allows us to state the following. 
 
Proposition 1  
 
If investors misperceive H-signals, as in (3), then
(a) If P0 > 0, then Pt > P
R
t , t = 1, 2, …
(b) If P0 < 0, then Pt < P
R
t , t = 1, 2, …
(c) limt→∞ (Pt – P
R
t ) = 0
The proof is straightforward and so omitted.
The inequalities in (a) and (b) indicate that price always over-
reacts to the L-signal, but not immediately, since the immediate 
price jump that occurs when the L-signal arrives is always ratio-
nal. Since we have normalized the initial price to zero, P0 > 0 rep-
resents a (rational) positive price response generated by a favor-
able signal L > 0. This is followed by subsequent prices that are 
greater than the fully rational price. If the signal is unfavorable, 
the reverse is true. Part (c) implies that the extent of the overreac-
tion at some point starts to decline and that the asset price eventu-
ally converges to the rational price.
2.3. Overreaction and autocorrelations
Next we consider the evolution of price overreaction over time 
conditional on the realization of the L-signal:
(11)
We need to specify functional forms for f(w0L) and m(t), and to 
choose parameter values for πθ, πε and πδ. We specify f(w0L) = w0L 
for simplicity, and choose a (reverse) sigmoid form for m(t):
(12)
We set πθ = 0.5, πε = L = 1, and plot Pt – P
R
t  for various values of πδ, 
the precision of the H-signal, in Figure 1. The pattern of overreac-
tion is one that initially increases, reaches a maximum and then 
declines. As the precision of the H-signals increases, the magni-
tude of overreaction increases. This happens because the higher 
precision leads to greater weight being placed on the biased per-
ception of the H-signals.We examine next the pattern of return au-
tocorrelations implied by the model. The unconditional autocorre-
lation function is given by
(13)
We evaluate the autocorrelation function in the following case: 
πθ = 0.5, πε = 1 and πδ = 0.1. The result is plotted in Figure 2 and 
shows a pattern of positive autocorrelations at short horizons fol-
lowed by negative autocorrelations at longer horizons. It is there-
fore consistent with the empirical evidence documenting short-ho-
rizon momentum and long-horizon reversal. As one might expect 
from the results in Figure 1, qualitatively similar autocorrelation 
patterns emerge for other values of πδ.
The results derived from the model of this section are quali-
tatively the same as those obtained by Daniel et al. (1998) (hence-
forth DHS) from the multiperiod version of their model in which 
they introduce overconfidence and biased self-attribution.4 It is 
also true that confirmation bias has been identified as a source of 
overconfidence. But the way in which we model the effects of the 
bias is distinct from that followed by DHS. They show that biased 
self-attribution can generate time-varying overconfidence with re-
spect to a private signal, and assume that public signals are cor-
rectly interpreted. But as we noted above, Gutierrez and Kelley 
(2008) find that markets react similarly to public and private infor-
mation. We make no distinction between public and private sig-
nals, but only between the frequency (and hence the informative-
ness) of the signals. This turns out to generate new predictions in 
a model where we introduce signals of intermediate frequency. 
We examine this case in the next section.
3. A model with low, medium and high-frequency signals
The results of the basic model assume that low-frequency L-sig-
nals generate price jumps, and that these jumps are all i.i.d draws 
Figure 1. Price overreaction Pt – P
R
t  conditional on a favorable sig-
nal. This plots Pt – P
R
t  = w
H
t f(w0L)/t ∙ ∑
t
τ =1 
m(τ)  for parameter val-
ues πθ = 0.5, πε = 1, L = 1, and the following form for m(t):  m(t) = 1/(1 
+ 0.01e0.1t)and for different values of πδ as indicated in the box on the 
right of the figure.
4 For evidence supporting the hypothesis that equity investors are overconfident, see Chuang and Lee (2006) 
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from the same normal distribution. In Section 5 (below) we pres-
ent empirical results suggesting that this assumption is too simple 
to adequately describe the process that gives rise to jumps. To pre-
view those empirical results, when we examine high-frequency 
intraday returns for individual S&P 100 stocks, we find that each 
stock experiences a jump (on average) once every eight days. Most 
of these jumps are relatively small, with an average absolute jump 
size of about 1.4%. However, about 2% of all jumps are more than 
three standard deviations on either side of the mean (greater than 
5% in absolute value), and occasional jumps of 10–30% are identi-
fied. Thus, jumps appear to be more consistent with a mixture of 
at least two normal distributions: one which generates relatively 
small, frequent jumps; and a second from which an occasional but 
very large jump occurs.
To more accurately capture these empirical jump properties in 
our model, we introduce a sequence of signals of intermediate fre-
quency (M-signals) that provide additional fundamental informa-
tion about the value of the security. These signals are less informa-
tive and occur more frequently than the low-frequency L-signals. 
At the same time, they are informative enough to generate small 
price jumps, and thus are designed to correspond to the smaller, 
more frequent jumps just described.
3.1. The model with M-signals
We assume that the liquidation value of the security is given by
(14)
where λi ~ N(0, σ
2
λ
),  σ 2
λ
 < σ 2
θ
 , and θ, λi are independent. The ran-
dom variable θ is realized as before at time zero, and λi is realized 
at time ti.
We retain the structure of the model analyzed in the previ-
ous section, but now introduce a sequence of signals of intermedi-
ate frequency (M-signals) that provide information about the new 
fundamental variables λi:
Mi = λi + ηi   i = 1, …, N;    ηi ~ N(0, σ
2
η)                 (15)
occurring at time ti. Each M-signal Mi is followed by its own se-
quence of H-signals H it providing information about the same 
component of the terminal value of the asset. Thus
H it  = λi + ν
i
t,   i = 1, …, N ;   t = ti + 1, …, T .         (16)
where ν it ~ N(0, σ
2
ν
). The perception of these signals is also affected 
by confirmation bias. Thus
                              Mˆi  =  λi + dM(w0L, ti) + ηi         
Hˆit =  λi + dH(w0L, ti) + ν
i
t                                           (17)
The bias functions are assumed to have the same multiplicatively 
separable form,
dk(w0L, ti) = akf (w0L)m(ti)   k = M, H .                        (18)
The constants ak allow us to scale the magnitude of bias according 
to the frequency of the signal. We assume aM > aH. Just as in the 
analysis of the previous section, we can represent the information 
contained in the public messages as
(19)
We denote the precision of the variables λi, ηi and ν
i
t by πλ, πη 
and πν, respectively. Then the asset price is given by
(20)
The ith component in the summation becomes non-zero at ti, the 
time at which the associated M-signal is observed. Introducing the 
notation
we can write (20) more succinctly as
(21)
There are now two channels through which confirmation bias 
causes the observed price Pt to diverge from its rational value. 
The first, as before, arises because HˆAt ≠ H
A
t . H-signals about θ are 
misperceived as a result of the bias generated by the L-signal. The 
second arises because information about the fundamental compo-
nents λi is also affected by the same source of bias.
3.2. Effect of M-signals on autocorrelation patterns
The first question we examine is how extending the model to 
incorporate signals occurring at intermediate frequency affects 
the pattern of return autocorrelations. We examine this with the 
use of numerical simulations. The parameter values chosen are 
as follows: πθ = 0.5; πε = 1; πδ = 0.1; πλ=4; πη = 20; πν = 10; aM = 0.5; 
aH = 0.5 We simulate price paths over 100 periods, and assume 
that the time of arrival of the M-signals is random. The number of 
periods between successive signals is assumed to be lognormally 
distributed. It is chosen to be the exponential of a normal distribu-
tion with mean 2.3 and standard deviation 0.3, which generates a 
lognormal distribution with mean 10.4 and standard deviation 3.2. 
So on average ten M-signals will occur in each simulation. The L-
signal occurs at time 1, and the M-signals that follow occur at ran-
dom intervals.
The unconditional autocorrelations are plotted in Figure 3. 
We see that in contrast to the plot in Figure 2, at very short hori-
zons the return autocorrelations are negative. The pattern is one 
of reversal followed by continuation and then again reversal. This 
matches the pattern of autocorrelations documented in a number 
of studies (Jegadeesh, 1990; Lehmann, 1990; Lo and MacKinlay, 
1990; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1995; Gutierrez and Kelley, 2008).
Figure 2. Unconditional return autocorrelations with a single signal. 
This plots the autocorrelation function ρ[ΔPt, ΔPt+k] = 1/T ∙ ∑
T
t=
–1
k
 ρ[ΔPt, 
ΔPt+k] for parameter values πθ = 0.5, πε = 1 and πδ = 0.1.
5 We choose aH = 0 for simplicity. All we require for our qualitative results is that aH be significantly smaller than aM, i.e. bias is reduced in absolute 
magnitude for more frequently observed signals. 
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3.3. Further explanation of autocorrelation patterns
In the model with L-signals and H-signals only, we observe a 
pattern of autocorrelations that are positive at short lags and then 
become negative at longer lags. However, when M-signals are in-
troduced, very short lag autocorrelations are negative, become 
positive at intermediate lags and then again turn negative at long 
lags. To help understand the sources of these autocorrelation pat-
terns, note that whenever there is a shock to an asset price that 
moves it away from fundamental value, this will induce negative 
autocorrelation at a horizon that is dependent on the speed with 
which the deviation is corrected.
In the model with L-signals and H-signals only, the more in-
formative L-signal induces a drift away from fundamental value 
when the first H-signal is realized. This deviation from fundamen-
tal value is corrected only relatively slowly as the effects of con-
firmation bias dissipate. The move away from fundamental value 
generated by the effects of the bias causes the initial phase of posi-
tive autocorrelation. Price correction occurs relatively slowly, pro-
ducing negative autocorrelations at long horizons.
M-signals convey additional fundamental information, but are 
interpreted in a biased manner, which results in a deviation from 
fundamental value. But learning about the fundamental underly-
ing the M-signals is more rapid and at short horizons it generates 
negative autocorrelation that outweighs the positive autocorrela-
tions induced by the L-signals.
In effect, the model overlays two patterns of overreaction and 
reversal, one over a relatively long horizon (related to the L-sig-
nal and its own H-signals) and the other over a much shorter ho-
rizon (related to each M-signal and its associated H-signals). The 
parameterization of the model is such that we get the initial in-
verted-U shape to the autocorrelation function. Clearly, the au-
tocorrelations are dependent on the particular parameter values 
chosen, but they do provide an explanation for two apparently 
unrelated asset pricing phenomena, namely the predictive power 
of certain price patterns used by technical traders and the pattern 
of return autocorrelations. In addition, the model produces sev-
eral sharp predictions about the autocorrelation in the time-series 
of jumps in the price series. By assumption, price jumps are asso-
ciated with the occurrence of L-signals and M-signals. If we de-
note the ith jump by Ji we may summarize the properties of the 
autocorrelation in the jump series as: 
 
Proposition 2  
 
The correlations between jumps in the time-series
(a) are positive, i.e. ρ[ Ji , Ji+j] > 0.
(b) decline over time, i.e. ρ[ Ji, Ji+j] > ρ[ Ji, Ji+k], j < k.
(c) are increasing in the importance of the information associated 
with the L-signal as measured by σ 2
θ
 .
(proof available upon request).
Properties (a) and (b) are self-explanatory. Property (c) makes 
a distinction between the importance of the information associ-
ated with the L-signal, σ 2
θ
 , and the precision of the L-signal itself 
(captured by σ 2
ε
 ). An increase in the value of σ 2
θ
 corresponds to 
an increased probability of larger realizations of θ, and therefore 
a corresponding increase in the probability of larger jumps associ-
ated with the L-signal. Thus, larger initial jumps will lead to stron-
ger correlations with subsequent jumps. Later in Section 5, we test 
the empirical predictions of Proposition 2 on jumps in US equity 
prices.
Although the qualitative features of our argument are not sen-
sitive to precise parameter values, there are certain relative magni-
tudes that are important. The low-frequency fundamental θ is cho-
sen to have higher variance than the higher frequency fundamental 
variables λi. It will have on average a larger impact on the value of 
the security, which then leads naturally to our assumption that it 
is information about the low-frequency component of fundamen-
tals that is the source of confirmation bias. We also need to assume 
that signals about the higher frequency fundamental variables have 
higher precision so that learning about the significance of these re-
alizations is more rapid. A framework which would render this as-
sumption plausible is one where the low-frequency fundamen-
tal variable is concerned with information that has a high degree 
of ambiguity or intangibility (“soft” information) whereas the high-
frequency variables relate more to “hard” information.
4. Technical price patterns
An important component of technical analysis is the use of 
price patterns as indicators of changes in a price trend. Although 
a large number of such indicators are used, some are regarded as 
more reliable than others, and are consequently more widely used 
by technicians. The occurrence of a particular price pattern is typ-
ically taken as an indicator of a change in a price trend, and there-
fore as a buy or sell signal. We will illustrate the use of such in-
dicators in the context of two commonly used patterns. Figure 4 
provides a schematic illustration of a price series displaying the 
“head-and-shoulders” pattern. There is fairly general agreement 
in books and manuals on technical analysis that the important 
characteristics of the head-and-shoulders pattern are the following 
(see, for example [Edwards and Magee, 1992; Bulkowski, 2000):
1. The “head” should be significantly taller than the 
“shoulders”.
2. The top and bottom of the shoulders should be of roughly 
equal height.
3. The overall pattern should be fairly symmetric i.e. the spac-
ing between left shoulder and head should be approxi-
mately the same as that between head and right shoulder.
The “neckline” in the figure is a straight line connecting the 
troughs between the two shoulders and the head. It is used to de-
termine the point at which a trade is initiated, which is where the 
neckline intersects the price series after the right shoulder. The 
pattern signals an imminent price decline, so the technical analyst 
executes a short sale. Figure 5 provides an example of the head-
and-shoulders pattern using a daily price series from Archer Dan-
iels Midland (ADM) during the 1997–1998 period. The left “shoul-
der” appears in July 1997, the “head” appears in September 1997, 
and the right “shoulder” appears in April 1998.
The “inverse head-and-shoulders” pattern is simply the pat-
tern in Figure 4 viewed upside down. In this case the pattern pre-
Figure 3. Autocorrelations in the model with M-signals. This plots un-
conditional autocorrelations averaged over 35,000 simulations. The 
parameter values are: πθ = 0.5, πε = 1, πδ = 0.1, πλ = 4, πη = 20, πν = 10. 
The number of periods between M-signals is lognormally distributed 
with mean 10.43 and standard deviation 3.20, rounded to the nearest 
whole number.
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dicts a rise in price, and the technical analyst buys the stock. The 
“double-top” pattern is illustrated in Figure 6. Here the pattern 
is identified by the appearance of two local maxima of approxi-
mately equal value. As with head-and-shoulders, the pattern is 
interpreted as a signal of future price decline. The “double bot-
tom” is an inverted double-top, and signals a future rise in price.
There are several studies which provide evidence that price 
patterns contain information that may be relevant for predicting 
future prices. Lo et al. (2000), henceforth LMW, develop an algo-
rithm for identifying a number of patterns including the four de-
scribed above. They find that the distribution of prices conditional 
on a pattern occurrence is significantly different from the uncon-
ditional distribution. Savin et al. (2007) use a modified version of 
the LMW algorithm to show that the head-and-shoulders pattern 
has significant predictive power for future individual stock re-
turns over horizons of one to three months.
An explanation for the predictive power of price patterns 
emerges from the model with signals of intermediate frequency. 
We consider the expected path of prices conditional on the initial 
signal L, which can be written as
(22)
We represent a “typical” price pattern by examining the ex-
pected path of prices conditional on an initial L-signal. We use the 
same parameter values as for the autocorrelation plot in Figure 3, 
and choose L = 0.5. However, we assume that the timing of M-sig-
nals is fixed and deterministic. The same pattern characteristics 
will be recognizable in distinct price paths even with random vari-
ation in signal timing, but if we were to average over these sepa-
rate paths this would tend to obscure the features of the pattern.
Figure 7 shows a graph of the expected path of prices condi-
tional on L. The head-and-shoulders pattern emerges clearly, with 
both shoulders and the head occurring as a result of the arrival 
of M-signals. In Figure 7, an initial L-signal has already arrived at 
time zero causing a positive jump (which can be inferred by not-
ing that the expected price at time zero is positive). Subsequent H-
signals are interpreted in a biased manner, producing the upward 
drift. The biased interpretation and subsequent correction of the 
first M-signal produces the left shoulder; the response to the sec-
ond M-signal generates the head, and the response to the third M-
signal produces the right shoulder.
Thus both the head and the shoulders in the price pattern can 
be viewed as analogues to the broader template of momentum 
and reversal except that they occur at higher frequency. Momen-
tum builds up and dissipates relatively slowly, producing the in-
verted U price path. It results from overreaction to the low-fre-
quency L-signal and is gradually corrected. On the other hand, 
overreaction to M-signals generates a sequence of inverted V price 
Figure 4. The head-and-shoulders pattern. This provides a schematic 
illustration of a price series displaying the “head-and-shoulders” pat-
tern. The “inverse head-and-shoulders” pattern is simply the pattern 
in this figure viewed upside down.
Figure 5. Head-and-shoulders pattern for Archer Daniels Midland 
(ADM). This provides a schematic illustration of a price series from 
Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) displaying the “head-and-shoulders” 
pattern using daily prices during 1997–1998.
Figure 6. The double-top pattern. This illustrates the “double top” pat-
tern. The pattern is identified by the appearance of two local maxima 
of approximately equal value. As with head-and-shoulders, the double-
top pattern is interpreted as a signal of future price decline. The “double 
bottom” is an inverted “double top”, and signals a future rise in price.
Figure 7. A “head-and-shoulders” price pattern. This plots the ex-
pected price path conditional on an initial L-signal (L = 0.5). The pa-
rameter values are the same as those used in Figure 3, except that all 
M-signals arrive at intervals of 10 periods.
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paths at higher frequency. The basic mechanism generating the in-
verted V paths is the same – overreaction followed by correction 
as the impact of the confirmation bias disappears. The head-and-
shoulders pattern emerges when one overlays the successive ep-
isodes of overreaction and correction on to the longer-term phe-
nomenon of momentum and reversal.
The identifying features of the pattern are evident in Figure 7. 
In addition, it is clear that the model confirms the predictive con-
tent of the pattern and is consistent with the findings in Savin et 
al. (2007). The pattern appears as the momentum phase terminates 
and is followed by reversal. In other words, it signals an imminent 
price decline. Some technical analysts specify also that if the pat-
tern is to be a reliable guide to trading it should occur after a pe-
riod of significant price increase. This characteristic is also consis-
tent with the path shown in Figure 7.
If the price path is calculated conditional on L = −0.5, with all 
other parameters given the same values, then we obtain the result 
illustrated in Figure 8. This pattern satisfies all the requirements 
for the inverted head-and-shoulders price pattern. It is a predictor 
of future price appreciation.
Experimentation reveals that both the head-and-shoulders and 
the inverted head-and-shoulders patterns are surprisingly robust, 
in that they will appear for different parameter values, different 
intervals between signals, and are also not sensitive to changes 
in the speed of decay captured by the function m(t). This accords 
with the claims of technical analysts that these particular patterns 
are among the most reliable.
Figure 9 and Figure 10 illustrate double-top and double bottom 
patterns. These patterns appear when the synchronization of M-
signals with momentum and reversal phases is shifted somewhat. 
Again, the price patterns predict future price movements consis-
tent with the technical analysis literature. In summary, the price 
dynamics from the model with signals of intermediate frequency 
are consistent with the presence and validity of several of the most 
common technical price pattern strategies.
The explanation for the predictive power of price patterns in 
the model lies in the combination of momentum and reversal with 
price jumps that are positively correlated with the L-signal that 
generates the initial price jump and the momentum phase. With-
out the positive correlation resulting from confirmation bias, sub-
sequent jumps would be equally likely to be positive or negative. 
A key feature of the price patterns we examine is the presence of a 
succession of jumps with the same sign.
For the patterns to emerge it is also necessary that prices gen-
erated by M-signals revert fairly rapidly to fundamental value. It 
is this that generates the peaks in the price series characterizing 
head-and-shoulders and double-top patterns. In other words, the 
price jumps associated with M-signals produce misvaluation that 
is quickly corrected. This in turn produces the short-horizon neg-
ative autocorrelation consistent with the findings of Gutierrez and 
Kelley (2008) and others.
Other researchers have proposed explanations for the phenom-
ena of momentum and reversal in asset returns that make no use 
of behavioral assumptions. Lewellen and Shanken (2002) and Brav 
and Heaton (2002), for example, show that parameter uncertainty 
and learning may produce these kinds of effects. George and 
Hwang (2007) present evidence to suggest that long-term return 
reversals result from the impact of capital gain taxes. The strength 
of our approach lies in its ability to provide a unified framework 
to explain not only short-term momentum and long-term reversal, 
but also reversals over very short horizons and a number of com-
monly used technical price patterns.
5. Jump-detection methodology and tests
We now turn to examining the model’s prediction that se-
quential price jumps for a particular stock will be positively au-
tocorrelated. Recently, researchers have developed econometric 
techniques that can effectively separate the continuous and jump 
components of the underlying price process by utilizing high-
frequency trade-by-trade data (Anderson et al., 2007; Barndorff-
Nielsen and Shephard, 2004; Tauchen and Zhou, 2006). These 
researchers effectively demonstrate that the difference between re-
alized volatility (RV), which approximates the total daily return 
variance, and bi-power variation (BV), which estimates the vari-
ance due to the continuous return component, is a consistent es-
timator of the return variance due to the jump return component. 
Figure 8. An inverted “head-and-shoulders” price pattern. This plots 
the expected price path conditional on an initial L-signal (L = −0.5). 
The parameter values are the same as those used in Figure 7.
Figure 9. “Double-top” price pattern. This plots the expected price 
path conditional on an initial L-signal (L = 0.5). The parameter values 
were chosen as in Figure 3, except that all M-signals arrive at intervals 
of 13 periods.
Figure 10. “Double-bottom” price pattern. This plots the expected 
price path conditional on an initial L-signal (L = −0.5). The parameter 
values are the same as those in Figure 3, except that all M-signals ar-
rive at intervals of 13 periods.
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Jumps occur when the statistic (RV–BV) is significantly different 
from zero, and we assume that at most one jump occurs per day.
It should be noted that we are not using the high-frequency data 
to examine intraday returns for the patterns described in the model. 
Rather, the econometric techniques require high-frequency intraday 
data as an input to identify when jumps occur and to estimate the 
size of each jump. Even though identified jumps occur almost in-
stantaneously, the output from applying the jump-detection meth-
odology is a time-series of daily returns, with each daily return de-
composed into a continuous and jump component. These daily 
returns are used to examine autocorrelation patterns over longer in-
ter-day horizons.
5.1. Data description
To test the predictions of the model, we are interested in ob-
taining a reasonably large cross-section of firms. At the same time, 
the data-intensity of high-frequency trade data creates practical 
limits on the number of firms in our sample. To balance these is-
sues, we use the sample construction methodology of Dunham 
and Friesen (2007), who analyze individual stock data for the com-
ponent stocks of the S&P 100 Index as of July 1, 2006. This limits 
our sample to a manageable number of firms, yet captures a large 
percentage of the overall US equity market capitalization.
The data are collected from the NYSE’s Trade and Quote (TAQ) 
database for the six-year sample period January 1, 1999–Decem-
ber 31, 2005, using only quotes from NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 
exchanges.6 Two other firms, United Postal Service and Goldman 
Sachs, went public during the sample period and for these firms we 
use data from the IPO date through the end of the sample period.
We use the bid-ask midpoint for each transaction to mitigate 
bid-ask bounce, and also apply several filters to eliminate errone-
ous observations. First, the offer/bid ratio must be less than 1.10 
for the quote to be included.7 Second, we apply a sandwich filter 
to eliminate quotes that are 10% or further in absolute value from 
surrounding quotes on both sides. This filter eliminates the follow-
ing erroneous type of quote sequence: a first quote that is imme-
diately followed by a significantly higher (or lower) second quote 
that is subsequently followed by a third quote which is consistent 
with the first quote in the sequence.8 Visual inspection reveals nu-
merous instances of such spurious quotes “sandwiched” between 
two otherwise consistent quotes, and our filter eliminates the er-
roneous quote. Without this filter, our estimation model might in-
correctly identify a significant jump when prices jump to the erro-
neous quote and then jump back to the correct price.
We only include quotes during regular trading hours, segment 
each trading day into five-minute intervals and calculate interval re-
turns using the bid-offer midpoint. For the first trading interval of 
each day, we utilize the opening daily bid-offer midpoint and calcu-
late the first interval return using the bid-offer midpoint calculated 
at the end of the first interval. We control for stock splits by eliminat-
ing any daily interval with a five-minute return greater  than 50%. In 
short, our data set includes all of the component stocks of the S&P 
100 Index as of July 1, 2006 over the sample  period 1999–2005, but 
excludes CBS Corporation (added to the index out of sample on Jan-
uary 1, 2006), resulting in a final sample of 99 individual firms.
5.2. Empirical jump properties
We first report cross-sectional summary statistics on realized 
volatility and bi-power variation in Table 1 for all 99 component 
firms in the S&P 100 Index over the sample period. The ratio of 
bi-power variation to realized volatility (BV/RV), or the square 
root of this ratio, which can be interpreted as a standard devia-
tion measure, has been used elsewhere in the literature to mea-
sure the fraction of total volatility generated by the continuous 
return component (Tauchen and Zhou, 2006). Panel (a) of Table 
1 reveals that approximately 90% of total return variance for the 
average firm in the sample is attributable to continuous returns. 
Total returns are decomposed into their jump and continuous 
components in Panel (b) of Table 1 in the form of sample vari-
ances.9 Total risk, continuous risk and jump risk are calculated 
as the variance of total daily returns, variance of continuous re-
turns, and variance of jump returns, respectively. Panel (b) of Ta-
ble 1 reports that jumps contribute between 5% and 10% of the 
total variance in the average firm, measured as the ratio of jump 
risk to total risk. Note, however, that these are unconditional 
variance measures that include all trading days in the sample, 
many of which have no jump.
In Table 2, we report distributional statistics for the cross-sec-
tion of equity jumps for all 99 firms in the sample, conditional 
upon a jump occurring. To do this, we first calculate the average 
value for each statistic separately for each firm in the sample. Ta-
ble 2 reports the mean, median, minimum and maximum values 
of the firm-level averages. Panel (a) of Table 2 reports jump fre-
quency, measured as the number of days with a jump divided by 
the total number of days in the sample, and shows that the av-
erage firm in the sample experiences a daily jump approxi-
mately 12% of the time, or about once every eight trading days.
Table 1. Summary statistics of equity jump data. This reports cross-sec-
tional summary statistics for the 99 component stocks in the sample. RV 
is the realized volatility measure and BV is the bi-power variation mea-
sure. Jump returns are zero on all non-jump days, and the daily contin-
uous return equals the total daily return minus the jump return. Total 
risk is the sample variance of daily returns. Continuous risk and jump 
risk are the sample variance of continuous and daily jump returns, re-
spectively, using returns on all days in the sample period.
 Mean Median Min Max
Panel (a): jump model parameters
RV 0.000718 0.000616 0.000285 0.002118
RV1/2 0.023048 0.021965 0.014376 0.038031
BV 0.000649 0.000548 0.000260 0.001937
BV1/2 0.021848 0.020867 0.013720 0.036493
BV/RV 0.9060 0.9087 0.8096 0.9313
(BV/RV)1/2 0.9482 0.9498 0.8896 0.9624
Panel (b): risk measures
Total risk 0.000442 0.000370 0.000166 0.001788
Continuous risk 0.000406 0.000342 0.000152 0.001697
Jump risk 0.000033 0.000030 0.000010 0.000132
Corr(jump,cont) 0.0069 0.0103 -0.2036 0.1398
6 The only S&P 100 Index component stock not included in the study is CBS Corporation, which replaced Viacom on the S&P 100 Index on Janu-
ary 1, 2006, a date just outside our sample period. 
7 For example, on 4/07/00 American Airlines (ticker: AA) has a TAQ record consisting of a bid quote of $68.125 and an offer quote of $80. All 
other bid-offer spreads for the day were much narrower, typically less than $0.25, and thus our filter eliminated this bid and offer quote. We 
also found occurrences in the TAQ quote data where a quotation appeared to be a typographical error or seemed inconsistent with surround-
ing quotes. For example, a bid quote of $23.375 for HCA on 8/17/00 is followed by a quote of $33.375, and surrounded by bid quotes of $33 or 
greater throughout the trading day. 
8 For example, a sequence of 3 midpoint quotes for American Airlines (ticker: AA) on 12/07/2000 are as follows; $31.03 for interval 1, $84.91 for inter-
val 2, and $30.66 for interval 3. An examination of all other quotes for AA on 12/07/2000 suggested that the $84.91 quote for interval 2 was invalid. 
9 We decompose total variance, and not standard deviation, into its component parts since the variance components are additive while the stan-
dard deviation components are not. 
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We also report an absolute jump size to provide an indication 
of the magnitude of jumps when they occur. Panel (a) of Table 
2 reports a mean (median) absolute jump size 1.39% (1.36%). To 
shed light on the meaningfulness of this statistic, we report sum-
mary statistics on the absolute daily return in the fourth row of 
Panel (a). The ratio of absolute jump size to absolute daily return 
implies that on days when jumps occur, the jump component rep-
resents nearly 90% of the total return, on average. Lastly, Panel (a) 
of Table 2 also reports jump variance and total variance. The ratio 
of jump variance to total variance, which is analogous to the ra-
tio (BV/RV) described above, shows that jumps contribute nearly 
60% of total risk for individual stocks (0.000275/0.000465). Thus, 
while the unconditional contribution of jumps to returns and risk 
is relatively small, they account for the majority of the return and 
variance on the days when they do occur.
Panel (b) of Table 2 reports the same statistics as Panel (a), ex-
cept that Panel (b) uses only equity jumps that occur on high re-
alized volatility days, which we define as days where an individ-
ual stock’s realized volatility is above its median realized volatility 
calculated over the entire sample period. As might be expected on 
higher volatility days, the mean (median) absolute jump size sub-
stantially increases to 1.91% (1.88%) but the jump frequency remains 
stable at around 12%. While the percentage of total risk attributable 
to jumps is marginally higher at 62% in Panel (b), the small differ-
ence suggests that the jump contribution to total risk is fairly robust 
to whether or not days of low volatility are included or excluded.
5.3. Empirical support for M- and L-frequency jumps
Table 3 reports several sets of statistics that are consistent with 
the presence of both M- and L-frequency signals in the model. 
Panel (a) presents some basic statistics on the pooled sample of 
jumps which indicate that the jumps exhibit slight negative skew-
ness and excess kurtosis. Panel (b) reports empirical quantiles for 
the sample of jumps, along with corresponding quantiles for a 
normal distribution with mean and variance equal to the empiri-
cal jump sample mean and variance. Relative to the normal distri-
bution, the actual jumps are more tightly clustered about the mean 
between the 10th and 90th percentiles, but also exhibit much lon-
ger tails than the normal distribution would predict. Panel (c) pro-
vides several formal tests that also reject the assumption of nor-
mality. While these statistics do not provide direct support for the 
specific form of M- and L-signals we model, they are consistent 
with the notion that jumps come from at least two distributions: 
one which generates smaller, more frequent jumps and a second 
which generates occasional but very large jumps.
5.4. Empirical autocorrelations
We next examine the nature of the autocorrelation between 
sequential equity jumps. Proposition 2 indicates that sequential 
price jumps will be positively autocorrelated. We start by exam-
ining correlations between sequential equity jumps at time t, t + 1, 
t + 2 and t + 3 in the first column of Table 4. Using only those trad-
ing days on which a jump occurs, we find an average autocorrela-
tion of nearly 0.035 between sequential price jumps. The autocor-
relations between a jump at time t and its subsequent three jumps 
are all positive and statistically significant, though the level of sig-
nificance between a jump at time t and t + 2 and between a jump 
at time t and t + 3 is slightly weaker at 5% and 10%, respectively.10 
To provide further insight, we also examine the autocorrelations 
on days of high realized volatility (as defined above in Table 2). 
These correlations are reported in the second column of Table 4, 
and are all positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.11
Table 2. Cross-sectional distributional properties of equity jumps. This re-
ports cross-sectional summary statistics for each variable for the 99 com-
ponent stocks in the S&P 100 Index sample. Jump size is calculated as the 
square root of the difference between realized volatility and the bi-power 
variation measure. Statistics for jump size, absolute jump size and jump 
variance are calculated for jump days only, and thus are characteristics of 
the jump distribution conditional on a jump occurring. Panel (a) includes 
all jumps. Panel (b) includes only jumps that occur on days of high realized 
volatility on which an asset’s realized volatility is above that asset’s me-
dian realized volatility calculated over the entire sample period.
 Mean Median Min Max
Panel (a): all jumps
Jump frequency 0.120687 0.114204 0.077273 0.265909
Jump size −0.000272 0.000030 −0.004045 0.004142
Abs. jump size 0.013858 0.013579 0.008939 0.022273
Abs. daily return 0.015698 0.015169 0.009676 0.025632
Jump variance 0.000275 0.000252 0.000097 0.000834
Total variance 0.000465 0.000423 0.000172 0.001149
Panel (b): jumps on days of high volatility
Jump frequency 0.122827 0.119318 0.069318 0.290909
Jump size −0.000411 −0.000370 −0.006229 0.005953
Abs. jump size 0.019114 0.018811 0.011627 0.030079
Abs. daily return 0.020887 0.020175 0.013047 0.036243
Jump variance 0.000467 0.000428 0.000150 0.001612
Total variance 0.000751 0.000671 0.000257 0.002531
Table 3. Pooled summary statistics and quantiles. This reports pooled dis-
tributional statistics for all significant jumps identified in our sample. Panel 
(a) reports basic distributional properties. Panel (b) reports actual quantiles 
and corresponding quantiles for a normal distribution with mean and vari-
ance equal to the empirical jump sample mean and variance. Panel (c) re-
ports statistics for goodness-of-fit tests for the normal distribution.
Panel (a): summary statistics
Number 20,941
Mean −0.0003
Standard Deviation 0.0171
Skewness −0.43278
Kurtosis 19.6313
Panel (b): jump quantiles      Actual                      Normal Dist’n
100% (max) 0.254 –
99% 0.0389 0.0394
95% 0.0241 0.0278
90% 0.0186 0.0216
75% 0.0113 0.0112
50% −0.004 −0.0003
25% −0.012 −0.0118
10% −0.019 −0.0221
5% −0.024 −0.0284
1% −0.038 −0.0399
0% (Min) −0.333 –
Panel (c)
Normality test Statistic p-Value
Kolmogorov–Smirnov D = 0.0972 < 0.01
Cramer–von Mises W2 = 46.524 < 0.005
Anderson–Darling A2 = 237.812 < 0.005
10 Two potential concerns are that the positive jump correlation we document may be due either to correlated errors or investor underreaction. 
First, if jumps are estimated with error, then any correlation in errors may be picked up as correlation in jumps. However, this is unlikely to be 
driving our results since the jumps we estimate occur in a specific five-minute interval. Given that on average there are 624 five-minute intervals 
between jumps (78 × 8 days), any error in the initial jump estimate is more likely to be correlated with the five-minute returns that immediately 
follow it than with a subsequent jump. A second concern is that any time investors underreact to new information, this will lead to positive au-
tocorrelations between the initial return and subsequent period returns. This can produce a positive correlation in jumps if both the initial and 
subsequent price corrections take the form of a jump. This is also unlikely to be driving our results, since it would require that the initial under-
reaction waits, on average, 624 periods before correcting with a second discrete jump. 
11 We have repeated our correlation analysis for jumps between 3 and 10 lags, and find that autocorrelations beyond 3 lags are almost uniformly 
positive but statistically insignificant. These estimation results are omitted for brevity but available from the authors. 
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In the context of the model, jumps associated with separate L-
frequency events are themselves uncorrelated. The predicted cor-
relation in jumps results from the jumps associated with M-fre-
quency signals that follow a particular L-frequency event. Thus, 
the correlations reported in Table 4 can be refined by identifying 
L-frequency jumps, and estimating correlations only between the 
L-jumps and the jumps immediately following them. Because our 
empirical jump-detection methodology simply identifies signifi-
cant jumps, it cannot explicitly identify L-frequency jumps. How-
ever, in the model L-frequency jumps are larger in magnitude than 
M-frequency jumps, and Proposition 2 indicates that the larger the 
value of the L-frequency jumps (as captured by σ 2
θ
), the stronger 
the correlation with subsequent M-frequency jumps.
Thus, we sort each firm’s jumps into deciles based upon the ab-
solute jump size, and use the jumps in the largest one or two de-
ciles as a proxy for that firm’s L-frequency jumps. Panel (a) of Ta-
ble 5 reports cross-sectional statistics for each decile of size-sorted 
jumps, and Panels (b) and (c) report correlations between L-fre-
quency jumps and the jumps that follow them. In Panel (b), L-fre-
quency jumps are identified as jumps in the largest two deciles, 
while in Panel (c) we use only the largest decile of absolute jumps. 
Conditioning on L-frequency jumps in this manner, we find that 
the correlations are two to three times larger than those reported 
in Table 4. In particular, the lag-1 correlation is 0.0603 in Panel (b) 
and 0.0919 in Panel (c), and both correlations are statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level.
While these correlations are small in absolute value, the size of 
the observed correlation in jumps depends upon the magnitude 
of the underlying investor bias. Few studies have explicitly quan-
tified the magnitude of the confirmation bias in individuals, al-
though Friesen and Weller (2006) measure the magnitude of the 
closely related cognitive dissonance bias in financial analyst fore-
casts. They find that while the cognitive dissonance bias is pres-
ent, it is relatively small in magnitude. Specifically, their estimates 
suggest that cognitive dissonance introduces a mean-shift bias 
into analyst forecasts of between 5% and 10% of the lagged fore-
cast error. In light of their finding, the correlations of 0.06 and 0.09 
reported in Panels (b) and (c) of Table 5 seem reasonable.
6. Conclusion
This paper develops a theoretical framework that can account 
for the apparent success of both trend-following and pattern-
based technical trading rules. Our model introduces a single cog-
nitive bias, which has been extensively documented in the psy-
chological literature and describes the tendency of individuals to 
search for and interpret information selectively to conform to a 
given set of beliefs.
In the model, information arrival is modeled with signals of 
various magnitudes, arriving at differing frequencies. Large, in-
frequently observed signals are interpreted rationally by inves-
tors. However, investors’ interpretation of less informative signals 
(which arrive more frequently) is biased by the recently observed 
large signals. The model generates price patterns that conform to 
a number of well-documented trading strategies.
In addition, our model makes two empirically testable predic-
tions. First, return autocorrelations are negative over very short 
horizons, positive over intermediate horizons, and become nega-
tive again over long horizons. This feature of the model conforms 
to the well-documented empirical properties of US equity prices. 
Our model also predicts that the time-series of jumps in the price 
series should be positively autocorrelated. We provide empirical 
evidence that confirms the prediction of our model that the se-
quential price jumps in equity prices are positively autocorrelated. 
Specifically, we utilized the bi-power variation estimation tech-
nique described in Tauchen and Zhou (2006) to identify all statisti-
cally significant equity jumps on the individual component stocks 
of the S&P 100 Index over the sample period 1999–2005. We find 
that sequential equity jumps exhibit statistically and economically 
significant positive autocorrelations.
Our model and empirical tests complement the recent empiri-
cal work of Gutierrez and Kelley (2008), who document negative 
weekly autocorrelations immediately after extreme information 
events, but find that momentum profits emerge several weeks af-
ter an extreme return and persist over the remainder of the year. 
This finding is consistent with the predictions of our model. Also 
consistent with our model, they find that markets react similarly 
to explicit (public) and implicit (private) news.
Table 4. Sequential equity jump autocorrelations. This reports correlations 
for sequential equity jumps at time t, t + 1, t + 2 and t + 3. The first col-
umn includes only days where a jump occurs, which produces a sample of 
n = 20,840 days; the second column includes only jumps that occur on days 
of high realized volatility, defined to be days on which an asset’s realized 
volatility is above that asset’s median realized volatility calculated over the 
entire sample period which includes n = 10,646 days.
                          All jump days        High-volatility jump days
Jump t 1.0000 1.0000
Jump t + 1 0.0350* * *  0.0384* * *
Jump t + 2 0.0246* *  0.0275* * *
Jump t + 3 0.0179*  0.0309* * *
*  Indicates where correlations are statistically different from zero at the 10% level. 
* *  Indicates where correlations are statistically different from zero at the 5% level. 
* * *  Indicates where correlations are statistically different from zero at the 1% level.
Table 5. Autocorrelations between L-frequency jumps and sequential 
jumps. For each firm, significant jumps are sorted into deciles based on ab-
solute jump size. Panel (a) reports cross-sectional statistics on size-sorted 
jumps. Thus, the smallest 10% of jumps for each firm are pooled into decile 
1 and the largest 10% of jumps for each firm are in decile 10. For this reason, 
the max jump size in decile j can be larger than the min jump size in decile 
j + 1. Panel (b) reports correlations for L-frequency jumps and sequential 
equity jumps at time t, t + 1, t + 2 and t + 3, where L-frequency jumps are 
identified as jumps in the largest two deciles. Panel (c) reports similar cor-
relations, but identifies L-frequency jumps as those in the top decile only.
Panel (a): absolute jump size  
                                   Mean              Median              Min                 Max
Decile
 1 (smallest) 0.00526 0.00510 0.00197 0.01089
 2 0.00706 0.00681 0.00384 0.01299
 3 0.00840 0.00813 0.00508 0.01572
 4 0.00967 0.00936 0.00611 0.01776
 5 0.01099 0.01072 0.00716 0.02068
 6 0.01251 0.01221 0.00810 0.02296
 7 0.01448 0.01408 0.00904 0.02624
 8 0.01706 0.01659 0.01001 0.03204
 9 0.02095 0.02038 0.01091 0.03810
 10 (largest) 0.03317 0.02976 0.01438 0.33337
Panel (b): correlations between L-frequency jumps and  
subsequent jumps (deciles 9 and 10;  
n = 4150) t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3
Jump t 1.0000   
Jump t + 1 0.0603 * * *  1.0000  
Jump t + 2 0.0400 * * *  0.0403 * * *  1.0000 
Jump t + 3 0.0447 * * *  0.0424 * * *  0.0543 * * *  1.0000
Panel (c): correlations between L-frequency jumps and  
subsequent jumps (decile 10;  
n=2053) t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3
Jump t 1.0000   
Jump t + 1 0.0919 * * *  1.0000  
Jump t + 2 0.0297 0.0380 *  1.0000 
Jump t + 3 0.0397 *  0.0304 0.0738 * * *  1.0000
*  Indicates where correlations are statistically different from zero at the 5% level.
* *  Indicates where correlations are statistically different from zero at the 10% level. 
* * *  Indicates where correlations are statistically different from zero at the 1% level.
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